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1. Introduction
The developments following the emergence of the Republic of Slovakia of-
fer unique insights into the interaction of policy-induced regional integra-
tion and domestic politics and implications for the way that a country goes
global. For starters, while there was strong political support for radical ap-
proach to reforms among Czechs in 1990–91, opposition against reforms in
Slovakia was increasingly strong contributing to the breakup of Czechoslo-
vakia (Fidrmuc et al., 1999). Following the emergence of Slovakia as asove-
reign state, the reform process had been stalled. Political transition was
also affected. Concerns over democratic consolidation swayed the decision
of the European Union (EU) at the 1997 Luxembourg summit not to in-
clude Slovakia in the first wave of countries to begin accession negotia-
tions. Yet, in a remarkable turnaround two years later Slovakia moved
from the “disqualified”’ status to an “acceptable” candidate and was sub-
sequently invited to participate in the first wave of accession in 2004. As
a result of the second transition – to borrow an apt term from Krause (2003)
– following the 1998 elections, Slovakia ceased to be perceived as an “in-
ternational pariah” and gained acceptance of the international community
(Pridham, 2001).
Political dimensions of the second transition have been extensively dis-
cussed in literature (Harris, 2003), (Krause, 2003), (Pridham, 2002), (Rup-
nik – Zielonka, 2003). While the emphasis varies in various contributions,
there seems to be a consensus that accession to the EU has been the driv-
ing force of the process, dubbed as “Europeanization”. The observers view
the EU as an external democratizing force providing consistent direct pres-
sure for the introduction and elaboration of not only democratic rules and
procedures but also civil and other rights with the final goal being the trans-
formation of an acceding state into a highly developed country in terms of
institutions and the quality of governance.
The principal instrument of “Europeanization” has been the EU’s as-
sessment of progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and harmoniza-
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the World Bank or its Executive Directors.tion of domestic regulations with the acquis communautaire. Until the Es-
sen Summit of the European Council in December 1994, the European As-
sociations Agreements (EAA) signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland in 1991 were devoid of incentive and punishment mechanisms.1They
offered many easy exits and, perhaps more importantly, lacked a well-de-
fined promise of membership. But the situation changed with the Coun-
cil’s request to the European Commission to design a strategy for prepar-
ing Central European countries for accession. The White Paper approved
by the Cannes European Council Summit in 1995 identified key legislative,
regulatory and institutional aspects of the acquis required for accession to
the EU. As a result, a strong punishment mechanism for exit has been put
in place.2
Slovakia was the first victim of the punishment mechanism. The Com-
mission’s avis (July 1997) accused the country of not fulfilling “[…] in a sa-
tisfactory manner the political conditions set out by the European Council
in Copenhagen, because of the instability of Slovakia’s institutions, their
lack of rootedness in political life and the shortcomings in the functioning
of its democracy” (EC, 1997, p. 31). In consequence, the European Council
at its summit meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997 did not include
the Slovak Republic in the group of countries invited to start accession ne-
gotiations. Slovakia was not alone. Other excluded countries for broadly
similar reasons were Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. But while
Slovakia expected to be part of the Luxembourg group, the others did not.
Indeed, it has turned out that “[…] democratic conditionality has been cen-
tral to Slovakia’s relations with the EU from the mid-1990s to the end of
the decade” (Pridham, 2002, p. 209).
Public fears that government policies jeopardized prospects for accession
to the EU seem to have tipped the political balance in favor of reformers in
Slovakia. The change of government in October 1998 has led to a new posi-
tive phase in Slovakia’s relations with the EU. The new government un-
dertook liberal reforms and the desire to converge to the acquis commu-
nautaire as its guiding principle. As a result, Slovakia began accession
negotiations in February 2000 and was included in the first wave of en-
trants into the EU.
The second transition has not only set the stage for democratic consoli-
dation but also for Slovakia’s integration into the global economy through
integration into the EU. Accession negotiations put relations between 
the EU and Slovakia on a new track of accelerated convergence of Slo-
vakia’s institutions and policies to the acquis communautaire. This has
called for deep reforms of the country’s economic regime – frequently politi-
cally painful, as measures taken infringed upon entrenched vested inte-
457 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
1After the breakup, Slovakia renegotiated the EAAand signed it in October 1993 with the agree-
ment coming into effect in February 1995.
2 Agenda 2000, published in 1997, was the first official document of the European Commis-
sion comprehensively addressing the link between the EU’s future evolution, its financing sys-
tem, and progress in EU integration and enlargement. It also provided explanation of the ac-
cession criteria, obligations of membership and laid out the strategy for enlargement. Agenda
2000 together with the EAA has been the core of the institutional vehicle for eastern enlar-
gement.rests. All these factors have changed investors’ perception and boosted fo-
reign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Slovakia.
This paper addresses two missing dimensions in the analyses of political,
“Europeanization” dimension of Slovakia’s second transition. First, the se-
cond transition has activated the “EU-factor” conspicuously absent in Slo-
vak economic development over 1993–98. Slovakia was then one of the worst
performers in terms of attracting FDI inflows despite its extremely favor-
able proximity and preferential access to EU markets, both of which les-
sened the importance of the domestic market size. The increase in FDI in-
flows contributed to the improvement in economic performance and seems
to have strengthened pro-EU coalitions thus exerting a positive impact on
political change towards improved governance. Furthermore, deeper pene-
tration of FDI has not only firmly inserted Slovak firms into the more so-
phisticated division of labor within the Pan-European economic structures
but has also created potential for boosting the productivity of domestic firms
through knowledge spillovers.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly exa-
mines the change in the quality of governance and cost of conducting busi-
ness and linking the surge in FDI inflows to the improvement in business
climate. Section 2 discusses the role of FDI in Slovakia’s foreign trade per-
formance and addresses a question of foot-looseness of FDI. Section 3 looks
at the international experience of FDI spillovers and compares it with de-
velopments in the Slovak economy.
2. “Europeanization” of Politics: Its Impact on Investment
Climate and FDI
The emergence of a new governing political coalition (September 1998)
claiming unequivocal commitment to close ties with the EU and structural
reforms has brought about significant change in Slovakia’s integration into
the global economy. While countries that opted in favor of radical reforms
in the aftermath of the collapse of central planning experienced a virtuous
cycle of economic change, Slovakia was in a vicious cycle in 1993–10398. It
failed miserably to create institutional foundations for sustained economic
growth and attract FDI, whereas radically reforming countries experienced
large FDI inflows attracted by a business friendly investment climate and
preferential conditions for access to the EU.
Both the “EU-factor” and business climate have been crucial to attract-
ing FDI flows, albeit the EU-factor alone would not have achieved much
unless accompanied by structural reforms. The policy-induced integration
process into the EU has offered economies of scale associated with prefe-
rential access to EU markets3. It has also provided legal guarantees of 
the right of establishment to EU firms. Further, it has compelled EU asso-
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3 The EU shortened transition periods for eliminating tariffs and quotas on industrial imports
from EU associates – by 1997 exporters of manufactures from Central Europe had duty-free
market access. Thus, investors seeking unfettered access to EU markets would also consider lo-
cating production facilities in EU associates.ciates to liberalize access to services, which are usually an important pull
factor. Taken together with other provisions envisaging an orderly process
of interaction between the EU and its associate members, these measures
have served as a credibility-enhancing mechanism. Last but not least, pro-
visions aligning economic regimes with those in the EU were particularly
significant because their implementation amounted to the promise of an or-
derly transition to an economy based on competitive markets with positive
implications for the pace of implementing second-generation, structural re-
forms.
The link between structural reforms and FDI is straightforward and well
established, albeit with a caveat.4 Garibaldi et al. (2002) have shown that
the quality of institutions explain the variation in FDI flows to transition
economies. In a similar vein, in the econometric analysis of factors affect-
ing the decision of multinational firms to establish a presence in transition
countries in the first half of the 1990s, Javorcik (2004a) demonstrated that
a greater progress of the reform process, a higher effectiveness of the legal
system, a low level of corruption and a high share of GDP accounted for by
the private sector have encouraged FDI inflows.
Slovakia’s experience with FDI since its independence gives further cre-
dence to the finding linking progress in second-generation reforms – one of
the major determinants of the quality of governance and ultimately busi-
ness climate – to FDI inflows. Indeed, until 2000 Slovakia has not been scor-
ing high in various international assessments shedding light on the progress
in second-generation, structural reforms, quality of governance or corrup-
tion.
But it has not been the worst performer among Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (CEEC-10) in the eyes of the international community as
captured by the annual survey of Transparency International. For instance,
Slovakia’s score in the Corruption Perception Index, providing assessment
of the quality of business as perceived by foreign businessmen and compiled
annually by Transparency International, has been below the average for
CEFTA-3 (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), but above that for the re-
maining CEEC-10 in 1998.5 One may add that viewed from this perspec-
tive, the decision of the EU to exclude Slovakia from the Luxembourg group
of EU candidates in 1997 took into consideration not only political criteria
but also economic institutional criteria.6
Table 1 presents more detailed data on the level of corruption in Slovakia
as measured against the average for CEFTA-3, two other countries not in-
cluded in the first Luxembourg group but accepted for accession in 2004
(Latvia and Lithuania) and the EU-15. The higher value of the index cor-
responds to a lower incidence of corruption. Three interesting observations
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4 There is an important caveat distorting this relationship. Privatization of state assets to fo-
reign investors may result in significant FDI inflows, even though the quality of governance
may leave much to be desired.
5 Slovakia was not included in the earlier rankings.
6 The political criteria were much more important. As Fidrmuc (1999, p. 633) noted: ”[…] the
Slovak Republic could be included in the first wave of accession if it makes significant progress
with respect to the political criteria.”can be made. First, the gap between acceding countries (CEFTA-3 and Slo-
vakia) and the EU in terms of corruption has been on the increase since
1999. Secondly, there was a significant improvement in Slovakia’s stand-
ing vis-` a-vis the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (CEFTA-3). Thirdly,
the two other countries which in addition to Slovakia were excluded from
the Luxembourg group, Latvia and Lithuania, have made much larger pro-
gress in terms of eliminating corruption and are regarded as ‘cleaner’ than
Slovakia.
An examination of the selected indicators of the quality of governance, as
measured by Kaufman et al. (2003), yields broadly similar results.7 Table 2
reports the average of three governance indicators – political stability, go-
vernment effectiveness and regulatory quality8. As above, the aggregate in-
dicator of the quality of governance is normalized in relation to the values
of governance indicators for EU-15, CEFTA-3 and Latvia and Lithuania.
Higher values of the aggregate indicator suggest higher overall quality 
of governance. Slovakia’s has improved vis-` a-vis both CEFTA-3 as well as
the EU. It appears that the largest progress took place in 2000–02.
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1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 Index, 2003
1999 = 100
CEFTA-3 average = 100 82 79 77 88 89 112
Latvia = 100 n.a. 109 103 100 100 92
Lithuania average = 100 146 98 85 78 77 79
EU-average = 100 51 49 46 49 48 98
Average CEFTA-3 as percent
of the EU average
62 62 60 56 54 88
TABLE 1 Perception of Corruption in Slovakia Relative to CEFTA-3, Latvia, Lithuania and the EU
Source: derived from data available at http://www/.transparency.org/pressreleases
1998 2000 2002 Index, 2002
1998 = 100
EU = 100 76.0 75.3 82.5 109
CEFTA-3 = 100 85.2 90.5 95.3 112
Latvia = 100 90.8 98.3 98.1 108
Lithuania = 100 105.5 100.2 96.4 91
TABLE 2 The Quality of Governance in Comparative Perspective
Source: derived from data presented in (Kaufman et al., 2003)
7 Kaufman et al. (2003) used statistical methods to combine several types of governance indi-
cators coming from multiple sources (including enterprise surveys, citizen surveys and expert
assessments produced by survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations and
international organizations) into a consistent set of indices comparable across time and coun-
tries.
8 Three other indicators measuring such dimensions of governance as the rule of law, control of
corruption, and voice and accountability are not taken into account. For post communist coun-
tries, they are strongly correlated with other three indicators, with the values of correlation co-
efficients equal or above 0.9. Hence, taking them into account into a single aggregate indicator
of governance would not bring new information.How has this change in the perception of the overall investment climate,
as captured by the perception of corruption and quality of governance, af-
fected FDI inflows? As can be seen from data in Table 3, the largest diffe-
rence between Slovakia and CEFTA-3 in annual FDI inflows per capita can
be found in 1995 and 1997.9 In 1995, as we argue below, this was a result
of change in the approach to privatization of strategic sectors in CEFTA-3.
The difference between the 1993–99 and the 2000–03 period is stagger-
ing. The annual average FDI inflows per capita to CEFTA-3 were more than
twice as high as for Slovakia in the 1993–99 period – USD 131 vs. USD 54.
In 2000–03, this relationship was reversed, with the average FDI inflow
per capita in Slovakia soaring to USD 458 and CEFTA-3 merely doubling
to USD 215. The share of Slovakia in total FDI inflows increased from 5 %
in 1999 to 10 % in 2000 and 17 % in 2002 (Table 3). As a result, Slovakia
was the second largest recipient of FDI among CEEC-10 on a per capita ba-
sis in 2000–02 (Table 4).
This sudden increase in FDI inflows can be attributed to the change in
the government’s approach to privatization and the improvement in the
business climate as to ensuing change in Slovakia’s international percep-
tion. Slovakia’s privatization policies and the way they were implemented
over 1993–98 were essentially biased against foreign investors. For starters,
they were highly unstable, with frequent changes in rules contributing to
uncertainty. In 1995–97 alone there were 12 legislative acts enacted (Rep-
tova, 1999). The approach changed as well. Voucher privatization lost steam
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Slovakia 37 38 34 52 16 127 72 384 326 789 333
CEFTA-3 73 60 167 123 95 169 229 231 241 235 150
Slovakia
CEFTA-3 = 100 51 63 20 42 17 75 31 166 135 336 222
Share in CEEC-10 4 % 4 % 2 % 3 % 1 % 4 % 2 % 10 % 8 % 17 % 12 %
TABLE 3 Annual FDI Inflows per capita in Slovakia, CEFTA-3 (Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland) and Slovakia’s Share in Total FDI Inflows to CEEC-10 (in USD and percent)
Source: Economic Commission for Europe (various issues) and IMF Balance of Payments database
Average
Hunga- Czech Esto- Croa- Lat- Poland Slove- Lithua- Slovak Bulga- Roma-
1990–99
ry R. nia tia via nia nia R. ria nia
187 150 122 86 81 71 69 55 41 28 24
Average
Czech Slovak Slove- Croa- Esto- Hunga- Poland Lithua- Latvia Bulga- Roma-
2000–02
R. R. nia tia nia ry nia ria nia
550 500 438 325 271 178 169 141 128 101 50
TABLE 4 Annual Average FDI Inflows per capita in CEEC-10 in 1990–99 and 2000–02 (in USD)
Source: Economic Commission for Europe (various issues) and IMF Balance of Payments database
9 While there are clearly differences in GDP per capita among founders of CEFTA, there are not
large enough to make comparisons of FDI in terms of per capita misleading.after independence, i.e., was replaced by other methods in 1992–94,10 re-
vived in 1995 and discarded for good in 1995. While voucher privatization
by definition excludes foreign direct investors, privatization through direct
sales, public auction or tender must, in order to attract foreign firms, “[…]
ensure transparency in their preparation, course and assessment” (Pazitny,
1999, p. 85). According to many observers, the actual practice was far from
transparent (Sicakova, 1999).
As a result, FDI inflows were limited until 2000. Hungary in 1995 alone
– as a result of privatization of then so-called strategic sectors, mainly
telecommunications and banking – received twice as much FDI as did Slo-
vakia during the whole 1993–99 period. More importantly, privatization-
-related FDI inflows induced other forms of FDI including green- and brown-
field investments and reinvested profits (Mihalyi, 2001). Similarly, mainly
thanks to telecommunication privatization, the Czech Republic received
slightly less FDI in 1995 alone than the total of FDI entering Slovakia 
in 1993–99. By the end of 1998, Slovakia received only 2.9 % (as com-
pared to 33 % in the case of Poland, 26.8 % Hungary, and 18.5 % the Czech
Republic) of all FDI that entered the CEEC-10 since the beginning of 
the decade.
The change in the government in 1998 and the associated acceleration in
economic reforms led to a dramatic increase in FDI inflows in 2000–02. Pri-
vatization was also brought under control in 1999.11 As a result, Slo-
vakia’s share in CEEC-10 FDI stock rose to 5 % by 2001, and to 7 % by 2003.
Privatization, structural reforms and better governance alone do not ex-
plain the strong response of foreign investors. Although investors are usu-
ally highly responsive to liberal and transparent economic regimes, had Slo-
vakia not bordered the EU and had not been part of the EU Eastern
Enlargement project the response would have been much less pronounced.
In other words, their occurrence on this scale would be rather unthinkable
in the absence of the “EU-factor.” “Externalities” associated with the EU-
-driven process of Europe-wide commercial integration that had led to 
the emergence of a single European market for industrial products played
a key role in the favorable FDI response.
The experience of Slovakia supports the view that conditionalities asso-
ciated with EU accession have been central to developments in both Slo-
vakia’s policy and economy. Yet, this centrality emerged only in the mid-
-1990s, once the EU has developed the Eastern Enlargement project. The EU
policy-induced integration process has instilled two necessary ingredients
for sustainable economic developments – framework for peaceful coopera-
tion and free trade in industrial products and an environment attractive to
foreign investment. But the European Commission was not a substitute for
domestic governments – countries that liberalized prices early, pursued
well-designed privatization programs and established market friendly en-
vironments were able to take advantage of opportunities offered by the “EU
factor”. Slovakia did so fully only beginning in 1999.
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10 Privatization in 1994 was described as “wild privatization” (Sicakova, 1999).
11 As Reptova and Valentovic (1999, p. 48) noted privatization encroachments have terminated
in 1999.3. FDI and Foreign Trade Performance
Since FDI inflows have been decisive in shaping the trade performance
of most of the CEEC-10 in the EU markets, the impressive performance of
Slovakia is somewhat puzzling. In spite of low FDI inflows, Slovakia
recorded the second largest increase in the share in EU external imports
among CEEC-10 economies after Estonia (Table 5). The top three perfor-
mers – Estonia, Slovakia and Romania – had two traits in common, that is,
the initial base was very low and there was a significant amount of redi-
rection of trade involved. Indeed, they all recorded the largest annual in-
creases in their respective shares in 1994–95 ranging from 45 % and 28 %
(Estonia), 20 and 14 % (Romania) to 36 and 20 % (Slovak Republic). In the case
of Estonia and Slovakia, the disintegration of states of which they were
a part was an additional contributing factor. However, while Estonia was
one of the most successful economies among the CEEC-10 in attracting FDI
inflows, both Slovakia and, in particular, Romania were among the worst
performers in this area.
Yet, neither Slovakia nor Romania provides ammunition against the ob-
servation that the “EU factor” has been decisive in attracting FDI and 
consequently in shaping foreign trade patterns of the CEEC-10. While Ro-
mania’s superb performance can be explained among others by its specia-
lization in low capital-intensive and low-tech, unskilled labor intensive pro-
ducts, the automotive industry (almost totally penetrated by foreign capital)
has been the lever of Slovak exports. Automotive exports accounted for one-
third of Slovakia’s EU-destined shipments of goods. In consequence, the sig-
nificance of skilled labor intensive and capital intensive products – usually
associated with FDI – impressively increased from 59 % in 1995 to 68 % in
1998–99. Foreign firms were responsible for the shift in Slovak exports to-
wards the EU, with its share doubling between 1993 and 1999 to 59 % and
further increasing to 76 % in 2001. A 75% increase in the value of FDI in-
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Index, 2002, 
2000 = 100
Estonia 100 214 320 371 432 450 432 594 598 652 110
Slovak Republic 100 145 186 190 197 254 261 236 275 360 153
Romania 100 136 164 163 177 194 199 205 245 326 159
Czech Republic 100 120 136 137 145 170 178 178 202 255 143
Hungary 100 114 132 145 167 200 218 207 225 249 120




5.01 6.15 6.86 7.04 6.90 7.90 7.96 7.18 7.51 8.23 115
Slovak share 
in EU imports
0.25 0.37 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.70 0.92 153
Share of EU in
Slovak exports 30 35 37 41 47 56 59 59 76 75 128
TABLE 5 Top Five CEEC-10 Export Performers in EU Markets over 1993–2002
Source: based on EU as reporter from UN COMTRADE Statistics and IMF Direction of Trade databaseward stock in the industrial sector in 2000 relative to the previous year
might have contributed to the EU taking 75 % of Slovak exports in 2002
with the growth in non-EU-destined sales not lower than that of EU ex-
ports for the first time since Slovak independence.
Taking advantage of Slovakia’s geographic proximity to the EU and duty
free access to EU markets, FDI has served as a force integrating the coun-
try into international systems of production. The tight connection of FDI
projects in Slovakia with an international division of labor can be clearly
seen in the trade statistics, particularly in those pertaining to the auto-
motive industry. While in 1993 Slovakia exported only USD 43 million
worth of automobiles, this figure was thirty-one times higher in 2000
amounting to USD 1.37 billion. Together with the Czech Republic, Slovakia
has become a Central European automotive powerhouse. The increase in
automobile exports has been accompanied by a large increase in the im-
ports of parts and components, however, the statistics also indicate grow-
ing exports of domestically produced parts and components. Exports 
associated with the network accounted for about a third of Slovakia’s ma-
nufacturing exports to the EU, and the overall trade balance in this net-
work was positive and equal to USD 570 million in 1998 and USD 370 mil-
lion in 2000. As the example of the Czech Republic and Hungary illustrates,
there is a lot of potential for Slovakia to further increase its participation
in the network.
Behind the impressive performance of Slovakia in the automotive net-
work stands not only Volkswagen but also other foreign firms, such as
Siemens (cable harnesses, lights), INA Werke Schaffeler (ball bearings),
Sachs Trnava (coupling assemblies for passenger cars), to name but 
a few. Siemens has ownership shares in fourteen Slovak companies, which
employ more than 8,900 people. Two thirds of the total of USD 353 mil-
lion revenues in 2002 were due to exporting. Figures on exports of se-
lected Siemens subsidiaries, presented in Table 6, also indicate Sie-
mens increasing contribution to Slovakia’s exports in the automotive net-
work.
Siemens subsidiaries have been involved in a variety of export activities,
all centered around providing inputs into global networks of production and
distribution. Osram Slovakia (part of the Siemens group) contributed to 
the growth of exports of electrical lighting and signaling equipment which
is being sold to the EU and the Czech Republic. Siemens has also been 
the driving force behind the exports of pumps – one of the fastest growing
product category exported to the EU.
Overall, about USD 2 billion worth of Slovakia’s exports was associated
with networks (including the automotive, office machinery, telecommuni-
cations equipment and furniture networks) in 2000 as compared to less than
USD 130 million in 1993. These exports accounted for almost 30 % of Slo-
vak sales to the EU in 2000. While in absolute values, Slovakia’s involve-
ment in EU-based networks is less pronounced than that of Estonia, Hun-
gary or the Czech Republic, in terms of its share in EU-destined manu-
facturing exports it is comparable to the performance of the Czech Re-
public and Poland. Furthermore, Slovakia’s involvement in the automotive
and information revolution networks is to a large extent responsible for 
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(Kaminski – Smarzynska, 2003).
The prominent role FDI has played in Slovakia’s international trade, goes
beyond the automotive sector. For instance, in each year during the
1995–2001 period foreign investment enterprises (FIEs), defined as com-
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Company EXPORTS (million USD) NET EXPORTS
(million USD)
Products and Exports 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
BSH Drives  – Production of high-quality
and Pumps,  electro-motors for domestic
s.r.o,  appliances, exported
Michalovce throughout the world n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85.6 74.5 79.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
– 100 % of production is 
exported to the US, 
Germany, Spain, UK, 
Poland, etc.
Siemens  – Production of cable
Automotive,  harnesses for Ford Fiesta,
s.r.o., Volvo,  Mitsubishi,  Volks-
Michalovce  wagen and Honda cars 39.6 82.7 95.5 124.7 49.0 36.6 39.4 5.9 8.3 6.6
– 100 % of production 
exported mainly to the UK, 
Germany and Netherlands
VW  – Production of cable 
Elektrické bundles  for  Volkswagen,
systémy,  Audi, Seat, Skoda
s.r.o., Nitra 0.0 0.8 4.7 18.3 66.4 66.4 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
– Clients: VW Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Germany
– Exports: 100 % 
Osram  – Products include: bulbs
Slovakia,  for motor vehicles, for
a.s., Nové  general use, special lighting
Zámky  sources, miniature lamps 
and high pressure sodium 
vapor lamps 0.0 n.a. 15.9 21.8 21.3 26.5 30.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
– Clients include automo-
tive industry in Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Germany
– 87 % of production is 
exported 
SWH, s.r.o.,  – Production of software for
Bratislava banks, insurance compa-
nies, mostly for foreign 
customers, such as German
Telecom or the subway  2.7 4.7 5.4 7.0 10.2 11.2 14.2 10.2 11.2 14.2
in Taiwan
– Exports approximately 
80 % 
TABLE 6 Exports of Selected Companies in Siemens Group in Slovakiapanies with foreign equity exceeding 10 % of the total, exported a larger
share of their output than domestic firms. In 2001, on average, a FIE sold
abroad 54 % of its output, a compared to 40 % in the case of local private
firms and 48 % in the case of public enterprises. Moreover, in 1995–96 and
1999–2001 FIEs had higher exports per worker than local companies. In
2001, the value of exports per worker was equal to USD 153 thousand in
FIEs, USD 19 thousand and USD 24 thousand in domestic private and pub-
lic companies, respectively (Kaminski – Smarzynska, 2003). It is interes-
ting to note that similar patterns have been observed in Hungary (Kamin-
ski – Riboud, 2000).
Further, FIEs accounted for the majority of the country’s exports and im-
ports. In 2000, FIEs (excluding trading companies) were responsible for
61 % of total Slovak exports and almost 60 % of imports. In 2001, these cor-
responding figures were equal to 52 and 53 %, respectively (Hoskova, 2001,
2002).
While FDI has served as a strong force behind integration with the EU,
investment inflows have not translated into a large trade deficit. The fact
that the overall contribution of FIEs to the trade balance was negati-
ve, albeit small in absolute value, was not surprising. The surge in FDI in-
flows is, as international experience indicates, often associated with a rise in
the import of capital goods. And indeed between 1999 and 2000, the value
of imports of capital goods from the EU increased around USD 100 million
or by 5 %.12
On the other hand, massive inflows of FDI eased adjustment to the legacy
of current account deficits of the 1995–98 period and appear to have pre-
vented what might have been a serious balance-of-payments crisis. Im-
pressive economic growth performance in this period has been deemed un-
sustainable (Fidrmuc, 1999). FDI inflows have been an important source of
financing current account deficits and increasing international reserves
during Slovakia’s second transition.13
Based on the data presented in this section, we can conclude that FDI in-
flows have led to increased integration of Slovakia into the global produc-
tion systems with focus on the manufacturing of both parts and final pro-
ducts. Foreign-owned firms, which are more export-oriented than domestic
firms, have been using Slovakia as an export platform to the EU and have
been the driving force behind exports of capital and skilled-labor intensive
products. Is this process likely to continue? To shed some light on this ques-
tion, the next session examines whether foreign firms are strongly rooted
in the Slovak economy and thus likely to remain in the country and con-
tribute to knowledge transfer to domestic firms.
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12 FDI may also affect the host country’s trade balance through other channels. For instance,
large capital inflows may lead to currency appreciation and thus decrease the competitiveness
of the country’s exports. On the other hand, spillovers from FDI may boost the productivity of
domestic firms and thus allow them to enter export markets. While the former effect can be ob-
served immediately the latter usually takes place with a lag.
13 This view is supported by the evidence from other countries. For instance, Frankel and Wei
(2004) find that macroeconomic crises are less likely to take place in countries with high shares
of FDI in capital inflows.4. Spillovers through FDI: Slovakia’s Experience in Comparative
Perspective
The international experience indicates that the process of developing net-
works of local suppliers in a host country requires time and effort on the
part of multinationals. Thus foreign investors who have developed strong
linkages to the host country’s economy are less likely to leave as the move
would be associated with the cost of building new supplier networks
(UNCTAD, 2001, p. 130).
While it is difficult to assess Slovakia’s experience in terms of linkages
between foreign investment enterprises and domestic firms without per-
forming a detailed national survey, casual observation and anecdotal evi-
dence lead to two observations. First, many foreign investors who entered
Slovakia have been followed by an inflow of FDI by key foreign suppliers.
Secondly, a slow but steady increase in local sourcing by foreign investment
enterprises can be observed.
The first phenomenon is referred to as “sequential investment”, and in
many parts of the world it is most prominent in the automotive and auto-
motive components industry and in some segments of the electronics in-
dustry. Brazil’s experience may serve as an example. General Motors and
its 16 global suppliers jointly designed and developed a plant in Gravatai.
While all but one of General Motors’first-tier suppliers of the Gravatai plant
are foreign owned, all of them use Brazilian suppliers at the second- or
third-tier of the supply chain (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 132).
There are strong indications that sequential investment has been taking
place in Slovakia. Volkswagen Slovakia has already been followed by more
than ten foreign investors stimulating production of electrical equipment,
machinery, metallurgical products and industrial chemicals (Trend, 2001,
p. 11). SAS Automotive, a fully-owned subsidiary of SAS Autosystemtechnik
GmbH (a joint-venture of Siemens Automotive and Sommer Allibert Indus-
trie AG) established in Bratislava in 2000, is another example of sequential
investment. The company is closely integrated with Volkswagen supplying
the German manufacturer with complete assembled cockpits consisting of
dashboards, electronic components, air-conditioning, airbags, steering rods
and pedals. The deliveries are done under the just-in-time delivery system,
which requires very precise coordination, logistics and production. For in-
stance, one must ensure a sufficient supply of more than 100 parts from va-
rious European countries and their timely removal from the warehouse. In
order to comply with the high standards set by Volkswagen the modules 
must be assembled error-free and delivered directly to the production line
of the specific car within two hours from receiving the order.
While it is often the case that foreign affiliates purchase locally a lower
share of their inputs than domestic firms (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 134), the in-
ternational experience suggests that local sourcing of foreign affiliates in-
creases over time. For instance, in Ireland raw materials purchased locally
as a percentage of total raw material inputs in non-food manufacturing in-
creased from 16 % in 1986 to 19 % in 1994 and in a sample of affiliates in
the electronics sector, the percentage of raw materials and components pro-
cured locally increased from 8 to 24 % in the same period (Gorg – Ruane,
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to the production of FIEs rose from 16 % in 1997 to 21 % in 1998 (Farkas,
2000, p. 15). In Poland, a sample of some 30 foreign affiliates responding to
a1997 survey reported that three quarters of their inputs were then sourced
from local firms, as compared to 65 % at the time of their establishment in
the early 1990s (Floyd, 2000). In the Czech Republic, Volkswagen-Skoda in
the mid-1990s was sourcing roughly three-quarters of its inputs from sup-
pliers based in the country. Of Skoda’s 279 registered suppliers, 174 (62 %)
were Czech-owned, 19 were Slovak-owned and 86 were foreign affiliates and
joint ventures with firms from the US, UK, Germany, Italy and France.
Volkswagen Slovakia has been successful at increasing its sourcing from
firms operating in the country, albeit not all of them domestically owned.
While in 1997, Volkswagen had only 4 direct and 9 indirect suppliers, this
number increased to 30 and 35, respectively, in 2000. Moreover, the value
of inputs sourced locally rose rapidly from USD 10.7 million in 1997 to
USD 278.5 million in 2000 (Table 7).
Affiliates of Siemens operating in Slovakia also source a significant share
of their inputs locally. As Table 8 indicates, the sourcing pattern varies by
industry. As the major obstacle to sourcing from Slovak companies, the af-
filiates list low quality of locally produced inputs, lower flexibility and in-
sufficient technological sophistication of Slovak suppliers. On the positive
side, foreign affiliates tend to appreciate the good technical skills of the Slo-
vak labor force.
The existence of linkages between FIEs and local firms is beneficial for
the host country for two reasons. First, the linkages increase integration 
of FIEs with the local economy and thus make FDI less footloose. Since 
the development of backward linkages with domestic firms entails costs and
effort on the part of affiliates, stronger linkages make it more difficult for
them to divest. Secondly, linkages are likely to boost the productivity of do-
mestic firms through knowledge spillovers, which is the issue to which we
turn next.
Productivity spillovers from FDI take place when the entry or presence
of FIEs increases productivity of domestic firms in a host country and
the FIEs do not fully internalize the value of these benefits. Spillovers may
take place when local firms improve their efficiency by copying technolo-
gies of foreign affiliates operating in the local market either based on ob-
servation or by hiring workers trained by the affiliates. When local firms
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1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of direct suppliers 4 19 21 30
Value of supplied inputs (mn USD) 5.3 311.7 334.7 252.8
Number of indirect suppliers 9 17 23 35
Value of supplied inputs (mn USD) 5.4 9.9 14.8 25.7
Total value of supplied inputs (mn USD) 10.7 321.6 349.6 278.5
1997 = 100 100 3,017 3,280 2,613
TABLE 7 Suppliers of Volkswagen Slovakia Located in the Slovak Republic, 1997–2000
Source: Skoda Auto Slovensko, s.r.o.benefit from the presence of foreign companies in their sector, we refer to
this phenomenon as horizontal spillovers. To the extent that domestic firms
compete with multinationals, the latter have an incentive to prevent tech-
nology leakage and spillovers from taking place. And indeed recent studies
based on firm level data from Morocco (Haddad – Harrison, 1993), Venezuela
(Aitken – Harrison, 1999) and the Czech Republic (Djankov – Hoekman,
2000) cast doubt on the existence of horizontal spillovers from FDI in de-
veloping and transition countries.
The evidence is more encouraging in the case of vertical spillovers, namely,
benefits accruing to domestic suppliers of multinational corporations. Such
spillovers can take place through several channels: (i) direct knowledge
transfer from foreign customers to local suppliers;14(ii) higher requirements
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Share of  Production Trend in Disadvantages/ Assistance Contract with
domestic/ inputs from Slovak advantages to local local suppliers
foreign Slovak suppliers of  Slovak Slovak
suppliers companies (%) suppliers suppliers
SMS Slovakia 85/15 25 Increase – – Specific project
Reaktor-test  85/15 74 Increase Low quality, All kinds Specific project




75/15 62.5 – technological  cooperation
sophistication
Project 
69/31 n.a. n.a. n.a.
management
















SBT   Poor quality,
Fire & Safety  10/90 n.a. 0 good technical Training Specific project
Securities skills
SAS Low  quality
Automotive 1/99 0 0 Suppliers  not – –
Bratislava * available
TABLE 8 Sourcing Patterns in Selected Companies in the Siemens Group
Note: * All suppliers are selected by client – Volkswagen.
Source: (World Bank Survey, 2002)
14 As numerous case studies indicate – see, for instance, (Moran 2001) – multinationals often
provide technical assistance to their suppliers in order to raise the quality of their products or
facilitate innovation. They help suppliers with management training and organization of
the production process, purchasing raw materials and even finding additional customers. Note
that the existence of linkages does not necessarily guarantee that spillovers take place nor does
the fact that multinationals may charge for services provided preclude the presence of spillovers.
Spillovers take place when foreign affiliates are unable to extract the full value of the resulting
productivity increase through direct payment or lower prices they pay for intermediates sourced
from the local firm.regarding product quality and on-time delivery introduced by multinatio-
nals, which provide incentive to domestic suppliers to upgrade their mana-
gement or production technology; (iii) indirect knowledge transfer through
the movement of labor; (iv) increased demand for intermediate products due
to foreign entry, which allows local suppliers to reap the benefits of scale
economies.
The following case study from Javorcik (2004b) may serve as an illustra-
tion of the vertical spillover channel. After a Czech company making cas-
tings of aluminum alloys for the automotive industry signed its first con-
tract with a multinational customer, the staff from the multinational
company visited the Czech firm’s premises for two days each month for an
extended period of time to assist with the quality control system. Subse-
quently, the Czech firm applied these improvements to its other production
lines (not serving this particular customer) thus reducing the number of de-
fective items produced and improving overall productivity.
The evidence consistent with the existence of vertical productivity spil-
lovers has been found in Hungary (Schoors – van der Tol, 2001), Indone-
sia (Blalock – Gertler, 2004) and Lithuania (Javorcik, 2004b). The results
of the Lithuanian study suggest that a three-percentage-point increase in
the foreign presence in downstream sectors (i.e., sectors purchasing inputs)
is associated with a fifteen-percent rise in a firm’s output in the supplying
industry.
Since the positive trend in FDI inflows is likely to continue in the com-
ing years, the focus of policies should shift from simply attracting FDI to
making FIEs more rooted in the local economy by increasing their local
sourcing. One way of promoting local sourcing is to provide assistance to
successful local companies which with some help stand a chance of becom-
ing FIE suppliers. Such a program has been operated by CzechInvest for
several years, and one could draw lessons from that experience.
5. Conclusions
To review the main points of this paper, one can make the following ob-
servations. First, the post-1998 change in the Slovak political environment
combined with the “Seal of Approval” from the EU altered foreign inves-
tors’ perception of Slovakia. Inflows of FDI have had a beneficial impact on
the economy and, one suspects, helped the continuation of structural re-
forms aimed at meeting conditions for accession to the EU.
Secondly, the surge in FDI inflows observed in recent years combined with
the favorable location of Slovakia and free access to EU markets is likely
to have a positive impact on export growth in the medium- and long-run.
Growing integration of Slovakia into international production and distri-
bution networks established around EU markets, sequential FDI and grow-
ing reliance on local sourcing will result in the rooting of multinationals in
the country and prevent their exit as labor costs continue to rise. In turn,
increasing contacts between FIEs and their local suppliers are likely to re-
sult in knowledge transfers, which may lead to faster economic growth in
the country and increased competitiveness in international markets.
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While the impact of EU ‘conditionalities’ associated with recent EU-accession ne-
gotiations has been widely discussed, little attention has been given to the effect of
post-1998 EU reforms on Slovakia’s greater integration with the global economy.
The convergence of Slovakia’s institutions and policies with the EU’s acquis com-
munautaire has led to a dramatic increase in inflows of foreign direct investment
into Slovakia in 2000–02. The available information suggests that the entry of fo-
reign firms has been beneficial in inserting the Slovak economy firmly into the pan-
-European division of labor and raising the productivity of domestic firms.
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